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TAKING BOARDS SERIOUSLY 
Jill E. Fisch* 
INTRODUCTION 
Today's corporate world i s  taking corporate governance anc!, 
in  particular, the role of the board of directors, very seriously. i 
The focus on  board composit ion and function has repeatedly sur­
faced in  proposals for reform, from the NACD Blue Ribbon Re­
port on Director Professionali sm2 and the General Motors Board 
of Directors Corporate Governance Guidelines3 t o  the ALI Princi­
ples of Corporate Governance.4 Commentators describe dramatic 
evolution of the corporate board-from a homogenous insider­
dominated club to a diverse and independent body.5 Boards that 
previously served a largely ceremonial function with a minimal ex­
penditure of t ime and effort can now, at least in  some cases, chal­
l enge entrenched management and redirect firm decision making.6 
Corporations, spurred on by activist inst i tutional investors, are de·· 
manding greater involvement  of directors through a variety ot pro­
cedures and incentives .  
The pressure on corporations to conform to  "good govern­
ance" mechanisms i s  substantiaJ.7 Corporations are subjected to 
highly publ icized report cards and rating systems evaluat ing their 
C0 Copyright 1997. Jill E. Fisch. All rights reserved. 
Professor of Law. Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Jell Colon. 
Charles Elson. Jon Lukomnik, Mark Patterson, a nd Steve ll1e l  for their he lpful cornm..:nt�. 
on earlier drafts and for the s t i m u l a t i n g  discuss ion by p art i c i p a nts in the sympo�;ium 
proceedings. 
1 See. e.g., Ira M. Millste i n .  The Professional Board. 50 Bus. LAw. 1427.  1429·-'! ( 1995) 
(describing recent adoption of corporate governance gu idelines a n d  codes of . . hcst prac· 
t ices " by corpor a tions, insti t u tional i nvestors. and various coun tr ies). 
2 NATIONA L  AssoCI;\TION OF CoRPORr\TE DIRECTORS. REPORT or TJIC NACO 81.ur 
RIBBON CO:VI\!!SSION ON D I RECTOR PROFESSIONALIS\! ( 1996) [hercinnfter I'·IACD 
REPORT] . 
.3 M app.  Al. at 25. 
-+ PRINCIPLES or CoRPOf{ATE GovERNANCE: ANALYSIS ,\ND RFC0\1\ICND.·\TIO>'S 
(1994) [ herein after PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GovER'iANCF ] . 
5 See. e.g . . E l izabeth Maclver Neiva .  The Current State of American C:orror<�t..: Gu' · 
ernancc (Feb. 1 996) (unp u b l i shet.l man uscript .  on tile with a u thor) (descri bing "clr<:m<Hic 
tra nsformation" i n  behavior and structure of corporate boards 0\·er the last  li::n \c:ars) 
r, Ser> id. 
7 Sec. e.g .. Jeffrey N. Gordo n . lnstitlltiOIIS as Rc/rl[iOII([/ 1!1\'CS!Ors: r1 Nell' rr;nf.:. IIi Ci!· 
11/u/arive Voting. 94 CoLL\·1. L. Rc:v. 12-1-. 132·33 ( 1994) (describing recent pr<.)p()�'ils �:up­
punccl lw institutional investors for rcfurm or board structure). 
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g:overnctnce ·practices.0 Institutional investors are registering: uro-.._, A L L' 1 
test votes at annual meetings in an effort to persuade corporations 
to take their boards more seriously.l) These efforts are supported 
by regulatory developments that place a growing emphasis on the 
use of independent boards or board committees in corporate deci­
sion making. J(l 
Corporations are criticized for allowing their directors to serve 
on too many boards11 or for utilizing ··trophy directors" who fail to 
provide value. L' To alleviate this problem, corporate attention has 
been focused upon obtaining qualified directors. u Corporations 
are also striving to strengthen director participation in corporate 
governance, both by structuring boards and board committees to 
facilitate independent action and by creating compensation plans 
that in creas e  the alignment of director and shareholder interests. 1'1 
Courts have embraced the model of an activist board and arc inc!i­
cating their willingness to impose liability on directors who tail to 
:-; Sec. 1·g . .. John i\. Bnne & R ich ard A. i'viclcher. Tlze Hc.11 l� Wonr Board\. Bts. \V�--: .. 
"!ov. 25. llJ96. at;-::: ( r<mkll1g �.5 best clnd worst boards on corporate g()\·,�rnancc practices): 
Comp<lilics A d opting Cnq>t)ratc Governance Guid elines : ·n1c CalPERS Lists NACO Rc­
!'()l{ 1 _ S!!pro note 2. �1pp. A2 at 32 ( listing those Fort unc 300 companies providing excep­
tional or '�xc,;llt:nt rc'SiXlllS<�s to CalPERS suggestions th<:t they consider imrlcmenting 
gov,:rn:lllcc guidelines): Ca!Pf:'RS Lists 12 Co111pauics in Etfi!rr 10 Focus Al/1'11/ion un Cor­
{)()i'!/1(' !?eiimn. 2-: s�·c. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. l.i. at ct:ZO (ivlar. ".:.7. llJ':J2) (describing 
C;!lPERS list or comp "nies t:!rgetecl for guvernance reform pressme). 
'1 See .Joseph A. Grundfcq. Jus! 1/()[e Nu: A IHininw!ist S1rutegr fin D!!uling ,,·f!lz 
f:Jurhuriun., Inside !lie Gutc.1 . .:15 ST.\.-.:. L. RF\'. �51 (I l)l)_)) (achoclting use ut· protest \'\lle 
stccllcgy): Bruc�· On1:dl ,\.: .h':1nn S. Lu blin. The P!urocrac,·: 1/'a Coillpum· f'rus;wn. S!wuid 
irs Dircuor.' Bciw•·c In r!zc JJonU. W.·\LL ST. L Feb. 24. 1997. c!l I (ck:scrihing protest 
\O!CS by 24 pensiun pLl!lS heC<lUSC or their nh j ections tu Di�ney's cmplmlle gnvnmlnce 
�t�} 11da r1.-.ls ). 
lll .\ee. e.g. Roheru S. Karmel. The liiill:'peiu/enr Corpur111c IJourd. A ,\leans hi W!w1 
End:'- 52 (;r:c, W.-\st!. L. 1\r\. 5.14. 5-P--15 ( l 1)84) (describing SEC <1ncl !'\lYSE reg.ubtions 
'�ncouraging usc of independ�·nt directors and board committees): .hmcs M. Tobin. The 
Squce;e on Diu'onrs--!nsitic Is Our. 49 Bus. LN\'. !707. 1 739-41 ( 1 994) (des cribing recent 
government initi<lti\·e:; :iddr(·ssc::d to corpurate gove rnance). 
11 Sec NACD R; 1'01-:!. s:tr>ru noie 2. at 12 (r-ccommendi1'g comp<lll!es restrict the 
number nl· directnrships held hv members of their boards). 
12 Sec .iuditil H. Dohr/1'11\ki. Wlzt"/1 Direcwrs Plin· :Hw:ica/ Chuirs. 0!.1'. T:,\ILc;. l\'uv. 17. 
llJ%. �-'- <ll l. (describing "lrophy eli rectors ... wcll-connectccl. high-prolilc individwds who 
sit on n: ui t iple hu�\ rds bu L pruvick� q u�stic,n<tblc \·�due). 
t.' Se,'. e.g . . .I<!  til�':; lvl. Citrin. Tlie Cusc fiJr Couning 'r'oung Direcwrs. N.Y. T�;,:rs. Sept. 
lO. {l)'J5. � .'1. <l' !2 (c\pi<1i1�ing !ww r�ilh<1ncec! requirements for direclOl' Jndepcillkncc cou­
pled \Vilh i!H .. T •_� n\ing tin1e required for c!irertc�r servic:� hc.1vc required LPrpnr(ll_ions to cx­
p<lncl l1t::mmi ir<�liiii,,:;<ll criic:riC� in Prder to timi qu,!lilic•d director<,). 
1--� See. e.g . . \'icl\lr I--l. Buytljicln. f-_·quir_-..· Strurt'gics fur (�un/j)('J!Stiling [)irccrors. ;VIE 1·1u '· 
!"1C>! . . J !·.\:-: c·i)P.P. c·<H �-.::� . . [)t_·c. JlJl)_-:)_ ::lt -l- tdc�cribing tr·-�nd t�nv�trd the usc or" ilonc.:�t�h cq­
L�tty-hdS• . :d l...:tillll"---'!·;�,;_:t::)i'l l"lll. dir' ... '\..:tur·;). 
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research , investigate ,  and ask chal lenging questions . 15  No longer 
can independent directors rubber-s tamp management  recommen­
dations without mastering the financial detai ls of proposed 
transactions .  
With the growing attent ion to  improving corporate boards, i t  
becomes important to  evaluate the merits of the reform propos­
als.16 Toward that end, a number of recent empirical studies have 
attempted to explore the re lationship between board structure and 
corporate performance . 1 7 To date, this work has failed to provide 
c lear direct ion about the value of restructuring the  corporate 
board. Accordingly, studies have not resolved the debate be tween 
those who advocate the independent board as the answer to all 
business i l ls1s and those who crit icize the  enterprise . 1l) 
Examination of the empirical work reveals an analytic short ­
coming in  the reform movement-the fai lure of many reformers 
fully to consider the appropriate scope of board funct ion .  fn partic­
ular, the focus on independence as a cri terion for evaluat ing hoard 
s tructure may place undue emphasis on the moni taring role of the 
c orp ora te  b o ard vvhi le i gnor i ng  i t s man agement  function. 
Although director independence may enhance the board's abi lity 
to  monitor e ffectively.  th i s  ga in may come at the expense of a de­
cline in the board 's  management  capaci ty .  Th is  analysis suggests 
that the normative vision of independence current ly embraced by 
the corporate governance movement is a vision tha t  imposes costs 
as well as benefits upon corporat ions that respond to  the reforrn 
pressure . 
15 See, e.g .. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig . . 698 A.2cl 959 (Del Ch . . l';)LJ(J) 
(summarizing developing case law setting forth obligations of corporate directors). 
16 Academic commentators have joined institutional investors in the effort to rcforrn 
board structure. Sel'. l'.g.. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinicr Kraakman. Rei111·1'!1ring rile Ourside 
Direcwrs: An Agenda J(n frlSiiiutional !nveswrs. 43 ST.-\N. L Rc:v. 863 ( llJ91) (proposing a 
corps of professional directors): \1artin Lipton & Jay \V. Lorsch. A A1odesr rru[I(}Siillin 
/mprOt ·ed Corporare Gm·emoncl'. 40 BL•s. L\w. 59 ( 1992) (proposing changes tc1 b(x1rd size: 
and structure to increase director involvement): i\lartiu Lipton & Ste ven A. Rusenb i um .. ·-\ 
NelV Sysrem of Corpowre Governance: Tlzc Quinquennial Election of Dirccrors. :'ii-l LI C1·11. 
L Rev. 187 ( 1991) (de scribing quinqucnninl election proposal). 
17 See infra Part Ill. 
1:-: See. e.g .. Charles M. Elson. Dirccror Compensrllion und rhe AILmuge;ncur-Coillllrn/ 
Bourd�Tiic ffisrurr oftt Svnzpwnz and a Cure. SO SMU L Rf::v. 127. 127 (JLJlJ6) (desc-rib­
ing ··the management-dominated. passive board of directors·· as ·· rhe most signi!lc<ll!\ 
problem facing corporate America today'·). 
I'J See. e.g . . Daniel R. Fischel. The Corporare Cm emrnzcc ,\{o,·cnzcnr. 35 V.\'-'D. L R1 ,._ 
1259. 1282 (1902) ( exp r e s sing :;1-:cpticism that ··independent directors "ill incre<tSl' ,;h;uc:­
huldcr wclle�rc··) 
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Recognizing that corporate boards can perform a range of 
monitoring and managing functions may explain the fai lure of m ar­
ket forces, despite pressure from institutional activists and regula­
tors ,  to  produce a single model of the corporate board 
corresponding to the reformers ' "flavor of the month . "20 M ore­
over, the relative value of the managing and monitoring functions 
of the corporate board need not be  uniform across the corporate 
spectrum. Although it may be possible to develop general predic­
tions, the importance of managing versus monitoring is more l ikely 
a function of firm-specific characteristics . 
The experience of Berkshire H athaway, which has resisted the 
temptation to climb onto the bandwagon of corporate governance 
reform, i l lustrates the shortcomings of the off-the-rack model  of 
the ideal corporate board . Berkshire H athaway's unique attrib­
utes-from the role  of owner and manager Warren Buffett to its 
atypical body of  long-term individual i nvestor shareholders-may 
justify a reduced emphasis on the monitoring board modet21 The 
B erkshire Hathaway experience demonstrates the degree to which 
firm-specific differences may justify variance in  board structure and 
function.  Reform proposals that reduce the board's role to moni­
toring and constrain a corporation's abil ity to choose a managing 
board threaten to deprive corporations of the ful l  opportunity to 
utilize the board of directors as a resource . The success of compa­
nies that defy popular governance trends should signal reform ad­
vocates to proceed with caution. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IVIONITORING BOARD 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern public 
corporation creates agency costs that interfere with efficient corpo­
rate decision making.22 I n  an effort to reduce these agency costs, 
corporate law has developed a number of mechanisms to align the 
interests of non-owner management  with the interests of share-
2n See. e.g., Tobi n ,  supra note 10. at 1 730-35 (describing v arious st ructural reforms ad­
vocated by ins t i tut ion al investors). 
2 1 For a general description of B erkshire H athaway's govern ance structure. sec Law­
rcnet� /\. Cunningham. Com p i l a t ion, Tlze Essays of Warren Buffeu: Lessons for Corporme 
rl:nerica. 19 CARDozo L. REv. 1 ,  29 (1997) (hereinafter Buff'eu Essays]. 
22 See. e.g. Fischel .  supra not e 19, at 1 262-63 (describing agency costs i nherent i n  the 
curporate fom1): John H. Matheson & B rent A. Olson, Corporare Lmv and rlze Longrerlll 
Sizurt'lw/dcr ;\lode/ ufCorpcmue Governance, 76 �,;[rNi'i. L. REv. 1313. 1330-31 ( 1992) (c\­
pL!i n i n g  h011· the separation or ownership from control re duces the incentive for those 
controlling the corporation to ma\imize efficiency and profits and 1ncreases the incentive 
lor man�lgement to pursue its own se l f  interest). 
1 997] TAKING BOARDS SERIOUSLY 269 
holders .23 Most recent ly, these efforts have focused upon the 
board of directors. 24 B y  empowering shareholders to elect the 
board and imposing fiduciary duties upon board members,  corpo­
rate l aw creates a structure resDonsive to shareholder interests .  
i 
Corporate law grants the board the power to  make various deci-
sions on behalf of the corporation, including the power to  choose 
the corporate officers,  set execut ive compensat ion ,  and review cer­
tain types of transact ions .  
Recent developments in  corporate practice have emphasized 
the monitoring aspects of the board's role .25 1l1e audit committee,  
for example,  now a staple of the public corporation,26 is focused 
upon monitoring the internal affairs of  the corporation and its com­
pl iance with financial reporting requirementsY Corporation stat­
utes provide increasing deference to corporate decisions that are 
subjected to  independent board scrutiny2s-even transactions tra­
dit ionally viewed with skepticism such as those involving conflicts 
of interest2l) or the decision to dismiss a shareholder derivative 
suit .3° Courts have emphasized that modern directors have an af-
23 See ADOLF A. BERLF. JR. & Gi'\RD!NER C. ML\'JS. THE i\loDERf': CoRPOR.\T!ON 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (describing separation of ownership and control and the 
consequent empowerment of management relative to shareholders): George G. Triantis & 
Ronald .J. Daniels. The Role of Debr in !nrerrrcrive Corporate Governance. S3 C'\L. L.  Rev. 
1073. 1075 ( 1995) (describing internal corporate governance mechanisms to .. deter ancl 
correct managerial slack 
.. 
as including the board of directors. shareholder proposals. the 
proxy voting process. and fiduciary duties). 
24 Sec. e.g . . Laura Lin. The Effecrivcness of Outside Direcrors As 11 Corpomrc GrHem­
ance A1 eclzanisnz: Theories awl El·idence. 90 N w. U. L. Rr:v. 39S. 900 n.-4 ( llJl)6) (describing 
focus on bo�nds as "part of on-going research on ways to align the interests of management 
and resiclual risk-bearing shareholders"). 
25 See Fischel. supra note 1lJ. at 12S0-81 (characterizing proposals to Increase indepen­
dence of boards ancl board committees as aimed at monitoring): Karmel. SiifJr!l note 10. at 
54 1-44 (describing historical clevelopment of independent boards as monitors). 
20 According to a 19lJCl stuclv reported in the Principles of Corporate Gm·emanu'. 99°/c, 
of responding companies had auclit committees. See PRINCIPLES OF CoRI'c JJ<.,\ 1r Govu<.:"­
X'iCE. supra note ..+. � 3.05 rptr. n.4. 
27 See John F. Olson et a!.. Audir Com mirrees of rlzc B oard of Dirccrur.1: Durie.\ allll 
Liabilities. P.L.I. Cmvi\IFRCI.\1. LAW AND PR,\CTICL CoURSE l-!;\NDllOUK SIRIFS 1 03. 167 
(June 4. 1lJlJ2) (describing role of audit committee as general monitor of the internal �1ffairs 
of the corporation). 
2s See 'Walter Werner. Corpururion Lmv in Seurclz of irs Fururc. Sl CuLU\1. L. RI.\. 
10 1 1. 1 064 (19SL) (questioning propriety of judicial deference tu decisions by so-called 
independent clirectors). 
2'.l Sec generulil Kenneth B. Da\·is. Jr.. Approval hv Disinrcresred /)irecron. 2CJ .1. ('tJRP. 
L 21) (1995) (describing statutorv stanclarcls �lcldressing appnw:!l uf cunllict tr:l!lsactiuns 
by independent directors). 
'11 Sec. e.g . . Lin . . 1/lf!ril IH>tc 2--+. at lJil-4-12 (describing judici:!l reliance on independent 
hoard scrutin\ CIS :tssur:lllCL' u!' :tpprclpri�lte corpor�lle decision m:tkin_cc proccclurcs). 
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firmative obligation to monitor a corporat ion's compl iance efforts 
and can be subj ect to l iabi l i ty for their fai lure to do so .3 1  
In an effort to enhance the board's abil ity to  monitor effec­
tively, commentators have identified two goals for improving b oard 
structure and function :  greater director participation and greater 
director independence . 32 Proposals to increase the usc of board 
committees, limit the number of boards on which a d irector can 
serve/' and s tructure director compensation in  a manner that  re­
wards di rectors for i mproved firm performance,34 al l  at tempt to  in­
crease director participation .  Similarly ,  proposals that the b oard 
adopt formal mechanisms for evaluating the CEO and other  board 
members are designed t o  el iminate board passivity.35 
The goal of greater board independence is more difficult .  Tra­
dit ionally directors were classi fi ed e i ther as employee directors or 
independent directors. Categorizing  all n on-employee d irectors as 
independent has proven problematic ,  howeverY' Although most 
publ ic corporations  no longer staff their boards with mostly insid­
ers, many non-employee directors have substan tial profe ssional or 
personal t ies to the corporation or its CE0.37 These ties may inter­
fere wi th a director 's abil i ty to monitor aggressively due to fears of 
retal iat ion by the CEO. Consequently,  the perceived unwill i ngness 
of many non-employee directors to act independently has focused 
increased attention on the definit ion of director independence .38 
Recent e fforts to improve board moni toring have included re­
vising director qualification standards to  encourage greater usc of 
d irectors without relationships that could interfere with independ-
-'I See. e.g . . lu re C:aremark In!" I Inc. Deriva live L i  tig . . 698 A.2d 959 (Del. C:h. 1996). 
32 See Da\·is. supra note 29. at 217 ( describing how ··corporate governance debate . 
saw independent directors as the sol ution to a variety of business ills and ca l ed for their 
increased presence and more active participation on boards and key board commi t tees"'). 
33 See Dobrzynski. supra no te 12 (questioning elTectivcness of directors who hold large 
number or board positions). 
3-l See. e.g . . Lynn Brenner. /\re Dirccrors Chcrprtidl. CFO: i'v!r\G. FOR SE:"IOR FIN. E:-:­
ECUTIVES. Fch. 1996. at .12 (describing efforts t o  create director compen� �l tion standards 
that imprO\C director accountability). 
35 Sec. e.g. Ira VI. !vlills tcin. Tlzc E\'Oiuriolt of rite Cerrifriug Boord. 48 Bt.'S. L\w. 1485. 
1493-95 (ll)93) (describing hoarc.l's role in certifying execu tive performance). 
Jr, Sec inli·u notes 9'-1-96 and accompanying text (describing complications created in 
de fini n g InLkpcmkncc for purpose� ol empiricil analysis). 
37 S!:'e. e.g .. Orwall  & Lublin. supru note 9 (comparing Disney's claim that 12 of its 16 
directors arc independent with ;dlegations by inqitutional investors that many ur these so­
callccl l!ldcpendent direc t o rs have personal <Incl professional ties to Disne y nr i ts  CEO. 
Michael Eisner). 
·'" Sec. cg . . Victor Brudncv. Tlu: lndcpendeut Dircctor-flern·cnly Cu\· or Pore111kin Vii­
luge) l)) 11-\l(\ L H.L\. 597. 611-12 (JlJS2) (idcntit'ying psychologica l  and soci<11 con­
straints un outside dircctms' <Jbilit\ to �1ct imlcpendenth) 
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ent  action .  Stricter definit ions of independence range from barring 
al l  business relationships between the director and the company to 
focusing on personal as wel l  as business t ies . 3l) Michigan, the one 
state thus far to  enact a statutory definition of independent direc­
tor, has one of the s trictest s tandards . Under the Michigan statute, 
directors who have served on a firm 's  board for more than an ag­
gregate of three years, as well as those with fam ily or business rela­
t ionships with the firm or firm employees,  are not considered 
independent .40 
Corporations are also seeking to enhance director indepen­
dence through the use of board committees . 4 1  Committees are par­
t icularly usefu l  for e ffecting board monitoring because they allow 
independent directors to make decisions free from the risk of dom­
ination by insiders.42 Thus corporations are placing responsib i l i ty 
for reviewing executive compensation43 shareholder derivative 
sui ts44 in  the hands of independent board committees .  Fina l ly ,  pro­
posals such as separating the posit ions o f  CEO and Chairman of 
the Board45 or creating a lead director posit ion attempt to direct 
greater control over board agenda and deliberations into the hands 
of outsiders .46 
3 9  See N A C D  R e PO RT. supra note 2. app . C a t  37 (con ta in ing  defi n i t ions  o f  d i rector 
indepe ndence from various source s ) . 
40 See MicH.  CmiP. Lvws A N N .  � 450. 1 107( 3 )  ( West 1 990 ) (exc l u d i n g  !rum the de fi n i ­
t i o n  of  indepe n d e n t  directors a n yone w h o  h a s  b e e n  an o ff icer or  e mp l oyee o f  the  corpora ­
t ion or any of i t s  subs id iar ies  or who has  b us iness t ics w i t h  the  compa n v  exceed ing $10.000 
in t h e  pr ior  th ree years .  as we l l  as t hose with fam i l y  re l <I t ionsh ips) .  
4 1  Melv in  A .  E i senberg was one o f  t h e  ear ly  advocates o f  i ndependen t  hO<l rd com m i t ­
tees ancl exp l i c i t l y  cleser ibed the  dut ies  o f  h i s  proposed aud i t .  n o m i n a t i n g .  and  compensa­
t ion  comm i t tees in terms of mon i tor ing  funct ions .  See i'vl c:Lvi'< A .  E i s E !' I3 E RC< .  THE 
STR. U CT U R. E  O f - T H E  C O R P O R .·\ T I O � :  A LEG.·\ L A :-i ,\ l .YS IS  205-09 (1 976 ) .  
4 2  B w  see K a h n  v .  Lynch Comm u n icat ion  Sys . .  I nc . . 638 A .2cl 1 1 10 ( D e l .  1 994) ( ho ld i ng 
that  t hreat of insider domi nat ion was sufficient to prec l ude appl icat ion of business j udg­
ment rule to approval of  cash -out merger hy i n depen de n t com m i t tee) .  
4 3  Sec P R J i\ C J I'LES O F  CcmPORATc: Go\"ERN ... \ i\ C E .  supru note  4.  � 3A.lJ5 r p t r .  n . l 
( describ ing s t u dy tin ding tha t  93 % o f  report ing companies  had compe n s a t i o n  commi t tees) .  
4'l See. e.g. , Auerbach v.  B e n n e t t .  .')l).') N . E .2cl 994 ( N . Y .  1979)  ( au t h or iz ing  com m i t tee of  
i n dependent  d i rectors to  t e rm ina te shareho lder  cl e r i vc1 l i ve sui t and <lpp ly ing  b us i n e ss j udg­
ment rule to  commi t tee decis ion ) .  
45 Sec RoBeRT A.G.  ivl oNKS & N F I J M I !' U W .  \Vi\TC I I I '< ( ;  T i l E:  W .. \ T C I J F R ;; :  Cnr� Po­
R .-vTE G o v E J{ i\ A N C E  For< THE 2 1 sT C E I"TL R Y  1 79-SO ( 1 996 ) ( p roposing t h a t  pos i t ions  o f  
Chairm<l n  of  the  Board a n d  CEO be he ld  b v  separ<l l c  i nd iv idua l s ) :  E di tori a l  R o u n d  T<Ib le .  
Chair and CE.O: Should rhe .luhs he Spfir ? .  Ccm P. G ov F W, _.\ i\CJ:: r\J )\' J SO J{ .  i\pr . -:VI < ly 1. 993. 
at 37 ( ad d ress i n g  propos a l  t h a t  pos i t ion s be  se pa ra t ed in order to e mpu11 e r  the hu<trd ) .  
4A See Lip ton  & Lmsch .  supra n o t e  ! 1\ a t M ( sugge s t i n g  t h a t  bn<t rd:-;  ch< t i recl hy t h e  
C E O  ma i n t a i n a k <ld  t l u ts idc  d i re c t o r  t o  o l sd t h e  C E O · s  pm1 e r  over  t h e  i n furm<� t iun 
p ruv id e d t t l  the  humd .  the  ht l c ! rd  ai!cl ldd .  < t l ld the  di"ccl i l · en eSS U f  h u ; 1 r d  cl c: J i hcr (l l i U llS ) .  
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The end product of these efforts is a board capable of exercis­
ing independen t  oversigh t .  Restructuring board composi t ion and 
procedures reduces both the presence of corporate ins iders and 
their abil i ty to influence board decisionmaking. This movement  to 
take corporate boards seriously has identified monitoring m anage­
ment decisions as the primary governance role of the board of di­
rectors, in order to reduce the agency costs created by management 
decisionmaking. 
I I . TI IE  CoM PETING CoNCEPTION-THE MANAG ERIAL B oARD 
Board function need not  be viewed solely in terms of m onitor­
ing management .  Traditionally, the board of directors was the ult i ­
mate managerial authority in  the corporation.  Early statutes 
expressly granted the board, not management ,  the power to  run 
the corporation .47 Even at the t ime tha t  Berle and l\!Ieans wrote 
their c lassic expose of the separation of ownership and control ,  di­
rectors were defined as part  of the management structure rather 
than shareholder representatives .48 This definition is  significant 
because it recognizes the dist inct managing function of the board.  
The duties of the managing board include advising the C E O ,  
participating in  strategic planning, and reviewing the  s tructure of 
significant corporate transactions. These functions were original ly 
carr ied out by a board composed predominantly of  corporate exec­
utives .  Inside r directors had both the intimate fami liar i ty with the 
corporat ion and the time to devote to e ffective management of cor­
porate a ffai rs .  Although no bright line separates the board's  man­
aging and monitoring functions ,-+'-) the obl igat ions of the modern 
board continue to  contain a management component .  
The boar d 's  statutory obligations have typica l ly emphasized 
the board's management responsibi l i t ies over i ts  monitoring role. 
Corporation law statutes require board approval be fore a company 
4 7  See. e .g . .  Lmrv E .  Ribst e i n . L. i1 1 1 ircd L iabi!itr and Theories of rhe Corpomrion. 50 
MD. L .  RE v .  �ll .  93 n.52 ( l 9lJ l )  ( " E<nly s t <l t utcs absol ute l y  r e q u i red that curpur,l t i uns be 
m 'l il agcd by t h e  bn,ncl of d i rectors. and these sta t u tes  were i n terpre ted to render u n e n ­
fur c e clblc clgre e m e n t s  t h at subst a n t i a l l v  removed discret ion  fron1 t he board . " ) .  
-IX See B L'. RLV & i'vl F..-\ ;\S. supm nutt:> 23.  a t  l %  (del i n i n g.  m a n ;lg_cm c n t  as i n cl ud ing bot h 
t h e  Li i r c c turs a n d  t h e  u l' f iccrs uf the corpor a t i o n ) . 
-I'J  Sci' S t e p h e n  \'i .  B a i n b ridge.  /ndepe/1(/l'nr Direcrors und rlu: ,-\ L l  Corpururc Gm·cm­
! l l t tc Pm;ccr . Cl l Ci1 o .  \V,\ S I I .  L .  R r: v .  l 03"L 1 06-t ( l lJ lJ3 ) ( . .  [.T ] he l i n e  between m a n ,lgc m c n t  
< I I lLi lll l l l i i t u r i n g  is  ruuy ; I [  hest . " ) .  
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issues stock50 or pays dividends,51 even when these transactions in­
volve no element of m anagement self-dealing. The board is re­
sponsible for reviewing and approving mergers and other changes 
to the corporate structure.52 Finally, the board is responsible for 
maintaining and revising the corporate charter .53 
Although, as described above, recent j udicial decisions have 
characterized the board's role as that of monitor, courts also recog­
nize the management role of the board. 54 Accordingly, courts have 
consistently imposed the duties of managers on outside directors.55 
This is most apparent in the merger context ,  in which the courts 
have required active participation by the board56 and have he ld in­
dependent directors accountable for their fai lure to make sufficient 
efforts to maximize shareholder value .57 Particularly when in­
dependent directors serve on special  committees, courts appear to 
take for granted active participation extending well beyond the 
moni toring function.58 
so See, e.g. , REv. M o D E L  B u s .  C o R P .  AcT § 6.2 1 ( b )  (Supp.  1 996) ( g r a n t i n g  t o  b o a r d  of  
d i rectors t h e  power to  a u t horize i ssuance of stock ) [here i n a fter  R M B C A ] .  
5 I See, e.g., D EL. C o D E  ANN.  t i t .  8, § l 70 ( a )  ( 1 996) ( a uthorizing d i rectors to declare a n d  
pay d i vidends) ;  R M B C A  § 6.40(a) ( S u p p .  1 996) (gran t i n g  to  board o f  d i rectors the  powe r  
to  auth orize distr ibut ions t o  s h areholders) .  
5 2  See, e .g. ,  D EL. CoDE ANN. t i t .  8,  § 25 l (b )  (requiring board of  d i rectors to adopt a 
resol u t ion approving an agreement  of m erger) :  id. § 271 ( a )  (requir ing board approval for 
s a l e .  lease.  or exchange of a l l  or subs t a n t i a l l y  a l l  of t h e  corporate asse ts) :  id. � 2 75 ( a )  ( re­
quir ing board approval  for d i ssolu t ion ) .  
5 3 See. e.g. , id. � 242(b) (l ) (requir ing board of  directors t o  adopt resolut ion t o  amend 
t h e  certif icate of i n corpor a t i o n ) .  
5 - 1  See. e. g . .  C a n a l  Capit a l  Corp. v. Fren c h ,  No.  C I V . A. 1 1 ,76-+. 1 992 W L  1 5 9008. a t  ' 3  
( D e l .  Ch. July 2, 1 992)  ( descr i bing director's  "ma nage r i a l  dut ies"  d e fi n e d  as " r e l a t [ i n g J  to 
s upervis ion.  d i rect ion,  and control " ) .  
5 5  See generallv James L. Griffith.  J r . .  Director O versight L iabiliry: Twenry- Firsl Cenwn· 
Swnr/ards and Legis/alive Comrols on Liabili1y, 20 D E L .  J .  CoRP. L. 653 ( 1 995)  ( argu i ng 
t h a t  modern regul a tory developments h ave heightened t h e  d i rector's d u t y  of oversight a n d  
reduced the  ci rcumstances u n d e r  wh ich directors can delegate t h e i r  ma nageria l  a ut h or i ty 
or rely on manage m e n t ) .  
56 See, e.g., M i l l s  Acquis i t ion C o .  v. Macm i l l a n .  lnc  . . 559 A .2cl 1 26 1 .  1 285 ( D e l .  1 989) 
( re q uir ing " t he i n te n se scr u t i n y  nnd part ic ipat ion of t h e  independent  d i rectors' ·  in  f u l li l l i n g  
t h e i r  du t ies u n d e r  Revlon ) .  
5 7  See Para mount  Com m u n i cations I nc. v. Q V C  Network I n c  . .  6 3 7  A.2cl 3 4 ,  43 ( D e l .  
1994) ( ho l d ing t h a t  d i rectors h a d  " th e  o b l igat ion of  act ing reasonably to s e e k  t h e  t r a nsac­
t ion o ffering t h e  best value reasona bly  avai lable  to  the s tock holders" ) :  see also Ci tron v .  
Fa irch i l d  Camera and [nstrume n t  Corp. , 569 A.2d 5 3 , 66 ( D e l .  1 989 ) ( d iscussing . . a hoard 's 
act ive an d  d irect role in the s a l e  process ' ' ) . 
�c: See, e. g. ,  Citron v. E . l .  D u Pont de Nemo urs & Co . . 584 J\ . 2 d 490. 504 ( D d  C:h .  l 9lJ( ) )  
( descr i b i n g  negot i at i on of  me rger by commit tee of i n de p e n d e n t  direc tors ) :  K a pl �1 n  \ .  Wy­
at t . -199 A.2d 1184. l l 87 ( De l . 1 985) ( descr ib ing how. in t h e  course of i t s  i n vcq ig<l t ion or 
comp l a i n t  in  sh a re h o l de r  deri\'<Hive s u i t .  two-director i n d e pe nden t l i t igat ion cum m i t t t:c: 
" i n  tcrv icwcd 140 pe0pk t h rougho u t  the wmld . , ) . 
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The developments in modern corporate governance that  em­
phasize greater director participation contemplate a board that 
manages as well  as monitors .  Commentators, activists, and even 
courts have begun to advocate greater director responsibi li ty for 
firm performance .5\) For example ,  reformers have demanded that 
the board of directors develop a long-term strategic p l an for the 
corporat ion.60 Strategic p lanning is c learly a managing function . 6 t  
Choosing the  corporation's  executive officers and sett ing their 
compensation is a lso,  at l east in part ,  a m anagement task .  
Independence is not the only relevant qualification for an ef­
fective managing board. I n  order to formulate a strategic  p lan ,  de­
termine whether a merger wil l  p rovide long-term value, or select 
an executive capable of running the business ,  directors need a de­
ta i led familiarity with and appreciat ion for the nature of the corpo­
ration they oversee .62 Corporate insiders such as present and 
former employees are l ikely to be more fami l iar with the corpora­
t ion than outsiders who attend twelve meetings a year. D irectors 
in  related industries, or those who have business re lationships with 
th e company, can serve as resources ,  contributing valuable exper­
t ise in addition to general management talent .f<' 
5 LJ  See. e.g . .  Mart i n  Lipton & 11J eodore N .  ivl i rvis. E."nhauced Scmtiny anrl  Corporare 
Perfouu ancc: Th e NeH· Frontier fo r Corporute D irccrors . 20 D r: L.  J. Co R. P. L. 1 23 .  l 26-27 
( 1 '.!95 ) ( descri b ing sta tements by commenta t ors. j udges. and i nst i t u t ional  i nvestors advo­
c a t i n g  greater director responsib i l i ty for f] rm performa nce ) .  
�>t > Sec id. at 1 26 (quot ing s p e e c h  b y  Chancel lor  Wi l l i am T. A l len i n  wh i c h  A l len s t a t es 
t h a t  ou tside d i rectors · ' should h ave a n  act ive role i n  t h e  for m u l a t ion of t h e  l o n g - te rm stra­
t egi c . fi n �1nc i a l .  a nd organ iza t io n a l  goa ls  of the corpora t i on a n d  s h o u l d  ap prove plans to 
achieve t hose goa l s ' · ) .  
<, 1 See, e . g  . . M i l l s te in .  supra n o t e  1 ,  a t  1 433-35 (descri b i n g  more act ive part ic ipat ion  by 
board i n  s trategic  p lann ing process ) .  
<,2 Sec. t' . g  . .  F ische l . supm n o t e  1 9. a t  1 282 ( q uestio n i n g  w h e t h er .  because i n d epe n d e n t  
d i rectors are u n l i k e l y  to b e  fa m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  bus iness.  t hey a r e  capable . .  o r  m a k i n g  a tru ly  
i m port a n t  dec is ion s u c h  <b dec id i n g whether  a merger or developm e n t  o f  a n e w  product  
�;h o u l d  go i"u rward or whe t he r t h e  chief  execut ive o rt1cer a n d  other  sen ior man ageme n t  
s h o u l d  b e  repl ace d " ' ) .  
h 3  -')ec Te le ph on e I n terv iew w i t h  E l izabe t h  E .  B a i l e y .  Professor o f  P u b l i c  Pol icy a n d  
\Lli l age ment a t  t h e  Wharton School a n d  D i rector o f  CSX . P h i l i p  M orr i s .  H o n eywe l l .  a n d  
"i d t i o n ci l  B <1 1lcorp ( J a n .  1 3 . 1 997 ) (descr ib ing value prov ide d by d i rectors i n  re l a ted i nd us­
tr ies 'm d t h use who h '1ve hus iness connect ions to the com p a n v :  . .  you need i n fo r m ation 
< lbout  rlw i n d us t ries that  vou deal  w i t h " " ) [ he r e i n a f t e r  B c1 i k y  l n t e l-v iew ] :  see o /.1 o D.  
Ci urdon S m i t h .  Corpurare Col·cmllllcc and J\rlonogeriol lnculi /pc!encc: L essons ji"o111  Knwl"/. 
n :\ . C.  L.  K H . 1 03 7 .  1 1 38 ( 1 996 ) ( s uggest i ng dep a rt ure of Du n <l i d Perk i n s .  t h e  on h 
uub idc  d i r•.' C t or \\" i t h  rc L 1 i l i n g  e .\pc_' r i e n c e .  h a �  h a mpered l..:: m < l l·t bo� !rcl · s  ;! l> i l i ty to (J dclress 
poor jiL· r !l l i" l 1 1 ( 1 !1Cl: ) .  
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Corporate t ies  a lso  serve to mot i vate  d i rectors t o  p articipate 
more active ly _<'-r A n  ins ider ,  whose career and compe nsat ion de­
p e n d  o n corporate p erformance , h as a gre a t e r  stake in t h e f!rm · s  
success t h a n  a n  outs ider ,  w h o  receives $50 .000 p e r  ye ar re gardl e ss 
of whether  the comp any does  wellY' Although vVarre n  B uffe t " s  
ho ld ings of B e rksh ir e  Hathaway stock a r e  an extre m e  example ,<>h 
m a n y  corporate execut ives also h ave la rge e q ui t y  h o l d i ngs in the ir  
comp an ies  w hi c h  give them a n  incent ive  to be a tten tive t o  stock 
pnce.  
Recent  reform e fforts h ave  at tempted to addre ss the rat ionzd  
apathy of outside d irectors by e ncouraging stock own ersh ip  re­
q u ire m e n t s  a n d/or e q u i ty-based compensat ion .67 S t u d i e s  sugges t .  
however,  that  few outs ide  d irectors a r e  m otivated b y  finan cia l  r e ­
ward s . 6:--: Indeed ,  m o s t  o utside directors a r c  CEOs of  o t h e r  major 
corporation s  and rece i ve suffic ie n t  compensat ion  t o  re n d e r  t rivi a l  
t h e i r  compensat ion for servin g  CI S  outs ide di rectors .  More over.  
w i th the  increasing ava i l ab i l i ty  and sophis t ica t ion  of der ivmive i n ­
s t rume n ts , a d i rector n e e d  n o t  re t a i n  t h e  undes i rable h rm-specific 
r isk assoc iated wit h  a n  eq uity p o s i t i o n  in  a cornpany on vvh ose 
bo ard he or she s i ts _ r,•; 
<'>-1 Sec B ;nrv D .  B a vs i n gc r  & Henry N .  B u t l e r .  Co r;}(mtrc Cm ·emunce und rlu· !3nuni 
D irecru rs: Pertimnance E!fc'CIS of Changes in Board Culilpo.l iriu n .  1 J . L. Ecr l i--: .  ,_\: O P. l i 
1 0 1 .  ! 1 5  ( 1 985 ) ( fi n di n g  best m i x  or d i rectors included il  :m:joritv  ( ) r  d i rcl' l nrs 1\' i l h  s u hsl;; n ­
l i c: !  l l ll i l l1 C i ;t l t ic :; tO the  •� < l lll p : t ll \'--(1 COm b i n a t ion O i' i lb ! cic d i rc C t l l rS C l ! ld  o u [ :; : dc d i !' l' C l ( ; !'>; 
\\'i t h  s ig n i lic:: n t  prufcss i o n a i  r•::: i a t i o n s h i ps such i !S  h;m h:  .. : rs. Ll\\ ycrs.  s u p p l : e rs. o r  
custom e rs ) .  
6 ='  Sec B <: nurcl S .  B l a c k .  The Value uf fnsrirwionu! !u t ·,·s;ur \ 1un irnriug.· r/ ; c  !:J ! i,/iiu : ·ui  
E t  idenu· . . 1 1J LCLA L.  R L\ . 89:1 . lJ l 7-20 ( I  LJ lJ2 ) ( desr:r i b i n." g c n c r;i l i i n d i n gs n l  Cl ) JT•: l ;: l iun  
hc l w e e J l  m s i d e  u w n e rsh i p  a n d  p n) l \ t ;i b i l i t y ) .  
(,r, A s  o r  Feb r u a rv 2 S .  1 9lJ7.  Wa rren B u l'l'<.: l l  owned a pp n ;\ i m a tc l v  _iCJ.7 •:; . .  o f  t h �: (! ;1::;� .-\ 
s t ock o r  B er k s h i re Hathaway.  repre s e n t i n g  a p p ru :\ i ll l <l t e l v  _) l) j ');, uf t h e  ; Jgg reg;1 LL' vo t i n g  
puwer. B u-:. Ks l l l l-:. 1  H ,\TI-1-\W A Y  ! �: c. .  P:-t ( J "\ Y  S i .·\Tfc .\ l i S I :i ( :-.'l ay 6 .  i LJ')(J ) [ h <:.' i"L' i n a JJ ,_ r  
P RO."\ Y ST.YIT\ I FNT ! .  
''7 See. e.g . .  B re n n e r .  supra note .3 4  ( descr i b i n g  nwvc m c n t  t < ! 'x a r d  c q u i ty-b;:scd U l m ­
p c ns�H i o n  lor d i rectors ) :  E l son . supro n o t e  I S . a t  L�0-3 I ( propm ing  c o m p c n �;J t i n g d i n.:c t u rs 
i n  res� :- i L: t c d  s t r !CK so t hc v  1vi l l  · ·possess a puwcr l'ul  p c r,t l l l i i l l i n ;: n c i <t l  i n cen t i \ e Lu c x <� m t : ! <..: 
qucst i n n <:b lc  m a nage me n t  i n i t i a t i 1·e:-; ll' i th  l h L' v i go rous .  i n Jqlt:ndenl .  : : n d  ch;dkngi n g  e1".: 
ut an o11· n c r" · ) .  
h:--: See B r e n n e r. supro note .3 4  ( q u o t i n g  Ci r<il : r  C ry.-; t < J i :  ·T , c  il > U n d  i n  repc;! i cd s t u d i ·c" ' 
t il < i l  payi ng  p e u p i e  i n  stnch: duesn · L  scem Lo m a k e  a m  d i ! t c; ; e n l-c . . ) :  J u d i t h  H .  D tl bi"i'\ l1�k i .  
O irn /IJiS 111 1 11 in l 'estnrs ur Odds 0\ i.'i f'rn· . N . Y .  T i .l i h  . .i:1 n .  1 2 . 1 9')(1_ <l t [)(1 ( dc::,u i bi n;:, < �  
s u n·c \' cnn d u·,· t c.: d  h v  D i rect orsh i p .  i n c . .  ! i n d i ng t h d t  · · l ' l i h  c.n ,; n  per c e n t  o t  t h e  _;( i i  d i r,_ : c ­
t c•rs \l' l : o  rL·:; ;;n ; lded L u  t h e  •;u n··:y �;l i d  t l l e  uppuri u n i l\ 1 · 1  t n LT�' � l S L' L' < J :; h  1 :1 c u m .: -..v �t� : l il 
i m pnrt ; t n l  ! acwr in t h e i r  mllt i\ a t i u n  tm join i ng ; :  hu.:rd .. ): L i n .  su;;ru n u l c  �-+. < t l  'c.i-P ( ! i n d ­
i n g  t h < t t  c m p i r ic ;d s t u d i e s  lEt\<;' n ot rcsoivcd t h e  i m p< te l  u i  · : q u i l l  u\IW.: r s h i p  o ; 1  i n ck p.: r, d -
( , ' ) \�_'{.' S t :.: \\.' i 1  /-\ . n � l l l k .  [)C l 'Uil !Uli.' l_':.!, l?cj(; n u .  i h i. '  f)eri i 'O!i 1 '{'.\ \ fu rl·: l 'l t u i d  r:.\-i 'C! i f i \ · c  
c·(_!Jn(<'l lSi f fi t JJ / . 7 !) r -· fl _-\ 1 . ' 1 .  B i ·� - L .J  . .  10 1 .  320-2�� ( : :.;t)5 ) r �.._k·�;�· r : !1 i ! � �-! t h t.� : � h i l i � \' !_ ) r  (' :\ :_·I...' L! t \ \ !_· :-: 
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III .  E MPIRICAL ANAL Ysrs OF B oARD CoMPOSITION 
As the foregoing analysis suggests ,  the choice between a man­
aging and a monitoring board has clear implications for board 
structure .  To determine opt imal board structure and thereby eval­
uate current proposals to increase board independence ,  it would be 
he lpful to ascertain the relative importance of managing and moni­
toring on profitabil ity. Recent empirical work has examined board 
structure to determine whether increased director independence 
can improve firm performance .70 To date,  the conclusions of these 
studies provide l i t t le support for the monitoring board . 71 Although 
the studies provide some support  for the proposit ion that  in­
dependent boards are more effective monitors ,72 evidence demon­
strating a relationship between independence and profitabi l i ty i s  in 
short supply. 73 
A variety of  empirical studies explore the relationship be­
tween board structure and monitoring. For example ,  Michael  S .  
We isbach finds that firms with outsider-dominated boards are 
more l ikely to remove a CEO when the firm is  perform ing poorly 
than firms with insider-dominated boards.74 Hamid Mehran shows 
that firms with outsider-dominated boards pay executives with a 
h igher percentage of equity-based compensation-a structure gen­
e ra l ly perceived to reduce agency costs and t ie compensat ion more 
t o  en ter i n to derivative contracts t h a t  sever the t ie between the econ o m i c  v a l u e  of  t h e i r  
e q u i ty-based compensat ion and the company's stock price ) .  The i ncentive e ffect o f  equity­
hast:d compensation may a lso be u ndercut by the fact that  stock price move m e n ts are 
l i k e l y  to be on l y parti a l l y  re lated to corporation-specific p er formance at best .  thus serving 
as a pl)Or indication of director effect i veness.  See, e.g. , id. a t  3 1 0  (finding t h a t  only 20% of 
sruck p r i ce variabi l i ty  was due to i n d i v i d u a l  corporation-specific factors ) :  FR ANK H. E.-\S­
T E R U R O O K  & DANIEL R. FISCH EL,  THE E coNOMrc STR UCTU R E  OF CoRPORATE LAw 192 
( l l!9 l )  ( d e scribing variety of ' 'events i n  the  economy as a whole" and in t h e  i n d ustry that  
" h <wc powe rful e ffects on the p ri ce of  any given firm's stoc k ' ' ) .  
7o Sec generally Lin,  supra n o t e  2 4 ,  a t  921-37 (summarizing empirical  s t ud ies) .  
7 1  Bw s e e  Elson.  supra n ote 18 ,  at  1 27 ( " A  common occurrence i n  many o f  our l argest 
corporations is  that passive boards are responsible for excessi ve execu t i ve com pe nsat ion 
;:: n d .  m or e  importan tly,  poor corporate  performance . ' ' ) .  
! '}.  See Benj amin E .  Hermal in  & M ic h a e l S .  Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen B oards of  
Directors and -n1 e i r  Monitoring o f  the  CEO 3 -4 (Feb. 16 ,  1 996) ( u npubl ished m a n uscrip t .  
u n  l i le w i t h  author) ( clescrihing studies  fi n d i n g  t h a t  i ndependent  boards p rov ide m or e  
nw n i t m i n g  of CEO) .  
7 -"  See Lyn ne L .  D a l l as.  The Rehuional Board: Three Theories o f  Corpomre Boards of 
D irn rur.1 . 22 J. CoRP. L. I .  1 8  ( 1 996) (descr ihing as i nconclusive t he resu l t s  o t  e m p irica l  
s t ud i e s  ct t t e m p t i ng to test  t h e  rel a t ionship  between i n clepenclent  directors a n d  cn rpor<t tt: 
i'': rfmrna nee ) .  
7 1  See M ic h a e l S .  \Vc isb a ch . Oursit!e D irccrors and C E O  Tu mover.  20 j ,  F t N .  E <  CJ 'i .  --\:1 1 .  
-l..)J ( I W\S ) 
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closely to firm performance . 75 Laura Lin summarizes several stud­
ies that  address the manner in which outside directors employ anti­
takeover devices and that conclude that outsider-dominated boards 
are more l ikely to use anti-takeover devices to increase share­
holder returns than to  entrench management .76 
Nlore generally, April Klein identifies a posi t ive relationship 
between the use of outside directors on monitoring committees, 
such as audit ,  compensation ,  and nominating committees,  and the 
benefits of monitoring-a firm's outstanding debt and free cash 
flow.77 Corporations with i ndependent boards obtai n  higher gains 
for target shareholders in connection with tender offers ,  transac­
tions that can produce a conflict between the interests of  share­
ho lders and managers . 78 Final ly ,  s tock price responses to board 
s tructure indicate a market perception that outsiders are more ef­
fective monitors. Stuart Rosenstein and Jeffrey vVyatt ,  for exam­
ple ,  find that the stock market reacts favorably to announcements 
of the appointment of outside directors . 79 Some empirical work 
suggests that this react ion is  misguided.  Sanj ai Bhagat and Ber­
nard B lack find a modest correlation between the  proportion of 
inside directors and stock performance at certain lcvelsY1 1  
Despite these findings, studies have failed to establish an em­
pirical l ink between board independence and profitabil i ty .� ' In  one 
of the most recent s tudies. Bhagat and Bl ack conduct a large scale 
survey o f  board composit ion and firm performance over a ten year 
7 5 See H a m i d  :VIchran .  Execurive Compens{/{ion Srrucrure. 01 1·nership. a n d  Finn Pa­
fi mnancc.  38 J .  F1 :--: . Eco:--; . 1 63.  1 65-66 ( 1995) .  
7h Sec L i n .  supro note  24. a t l)30-.17 ( f i n d i n g  e m p i riGl l  s u pp o rt t h a t  ou ts ider-dom i n ated 
hoard:; \v i i i  hciHIYC  i n  shareho l ders ·  i n terests  in  con nect i on wi th  tender  otl'e rs. e1 d o p t i u n  of 
po ison p i l l s .  a n d  o ther  con t ro l  transact i o n s ) .  
77 See Apri l  K l e i n .  Firm Procluct iv i tv  and Board Com m i t tee Structure ( A pr. 1 995 ) ( u n ­
p u b l i s h e d  m a n uscr i pt . nn ri l e  w i t h  a u t h o r ) .  
7.': See. e.g . . J a m e s  F .  Cu t te r  e t  a ! . .  D o ln dep en den r D irecrors Enhance Targer Slwre­
lwlder Wcalr/r D u ring Tell !ler Offer�-?. �3 J .  F1 N .  EcoN. 1 95 ( 1997)  ( ti n d i ng t h �I t  i n cl epe ncl ­
c n t  boards i ncre�Ise s h a r e h o l d e r  g a i n s  from t e n d e r  o ffe rs <l n d  sugge s t i n g  t l l <I t  o u ts ide  
d i rectors reduce ma n age m e n t  e n trenchme n t ) .  
7lJ See S t u a r t  Rose nste i n  & Je ffrey G .  Wya u .  Ourside D irecrors. lJoard Independence. 
llllli Slwrc/wlder Weol!h . 2 6  J .  F 1 :--: . Eco;-..; . 1 75 ( 1 990) .  
�1 1 See genemllv Sanja i  B h ag a t  & B e r n ard B lack.  Do [ nd c pe n cl e n t  D i rec tors l'vl a t t c r') 
( l lJ97 ) ( u npub l is hed m a n uscr i p t .  o n  ri l e  w i t h  a u t hor) .  
" I Sec. e. g .  i d.  ( ll n d i n g  n o  consis te n t  r e l a t ionsh ip  between the  rrupor t io n of  i n depcnd­
C IH d i rectors a n d  \'clrious measures of fi rm pe rlurm<mce ) :  B e n j a m i n  E. H c rm a l i n & 
\lich�Ie l  S. Wc: isb<Ich .  The Effc·crs of lJuard Co11 1posirion und D irccr Jn cc! l l ives on Fir1 1 1  
Paj(mnunce . f 1 '-: .  M c; ,\ JT  . . Wi n te r  l l)9 l .  a t  101 .  1 1 1  ( l1 ncl i n g  nu r•.: l a t i n n  bet \\ e c n boa rd 
cum pos i t i o n  a n d  f· i r m  perf o r m <l n c e  in s tudv  uf 1-!2 0-' '(S E l i rnb ) :  K l e i n .  supru no lL' 77 
( chi i m i n g no p�1 p e r  h <! S  fo u n d  a pos i t i n: associ a t i o n  be t we en h o a rd compos i t ion a n d  l i rm 
pc rfu r m �mcc ) :  \·' k h r<l 11 .  supra n o t e  75. a t  l SO ( f i nd i ng n o  s t a t i s t ic<i l h  sign i l i c m t  re l a t i on ­
s h i p  between ho<trd cumpos i t ion � 1 n d  me r a l l  l irm rc:rfo r m a nce ) .  
278 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vo l .  1 9 :265 
period and ' 'find no convincing empirical support for the conven­
tional wisdom that  large company boards should consist predomi­
nantly of independent directors . "82 One study by Anup Agrawal 
and Charles Knoeber even identifies a negative relationship be­
tween corporate performance and greater outsider representat ion 
on the board .83 Additionally, a few studies have found that  insider 
representation on corporate boards enhances the board's manage­
rial function . 84 April Klein's study of board committees ,  for exam­
ple ,  finds a correlation b etween the percentage of insiders who 
serve on board productivity committees-defined to  include strat­
egy, investment, or finance committees85-and firm productivity .86 
Another study finds a positive relationship between insider repre­
sentation and corporate research and development spending.87 Fi­
nally, the process of simply adding independent directors t o  a 
board to enhance board independence may be counterproduc­
tive /'s as studies have identified a negative correla tion between 
profi tability and board size .89 
"D1ere are several possible explanations for these findings. 
One poss ible explanation is that  board structure does not matter 
because corporate governance in general or board structure, in 
particular is trivial .90 A lt ernatively, empirical s tudies m ay not be 
82 B h agat & B l ack, supra n o t e  80. a t  54.  
8 3 See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. KnoebeL Firm Petformonce and !'vleclwnisms ro 
Conrrof Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 3 1  J .  F IN.  & Qu.-\NTITA­
TIVE A NAL. 377.  379 ( 1 996) (finding t h a t  " [b ] oards of d i rectors seem to h ave too m a n y  
outsiders · · ) .  
8-+ See John W .  Byrd & Ke n t  A. Hickman,  D o  Outside D irecrors lvloniror !'v!cnwgers1: 
Evidence jimn Tender Offer B ids . 32 J. FrN . EcoN.  1 95 . 201 -05 ( 1 992 ) ( fi nding t h a t  a com­
pos i t ion of 40-60% i n depende n t  d irectors maximizes firm's  p e rformance in acquis i t io ns. a 
subj ect  involving both m o n i toring a n d  m a nager ia l  roles for board involve m e n t ) .  
85  See Klei n ,  supra n o t e  77.  a t  26. 
86 See id. at 33-34. 
s7 See B arry D. B a ysinge r  et a l . ,  Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corpo­
rate H.& D Policy . 34 ACAD. MGMT. J .  205 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .  
8s S i m i l a rl y .  o n e  rece n t  study has  fou n d  n o  empirical  evidence t h a t  sep a r a t i n g  t h e  posi­
t ions o f  CEO and Chairman of the B o ard i ncreases performance and i n s t e a d  reaches the 
t c n t a t i \·e  concl usion that the p ractice o f  combi n i n g  the roles i s  e ffic ien t .  See James A.  
B rick e y  e t  a l . .  Corporate Leadershi p  Structure :  O n  t h e  Separat ion o f  t h e  Pos i t ions o f  C E O  
a n d  C h a i rman o f  the B o a r d  5 ( 1 995) ( un p u b li shed m a n uscrip t .  on fi le w i t h  a u t h or ) .  
S <J  See. e. g . . Theodore E isenberg & Stefan Sunclgr e n ,  Larger Board Size.  D e creas ing 
Fi rm Value a n d  I ncreasing Firm Sol ve ncy (June 1 996 )  ( u n publ ished m a n uscri p t .  on fl k 
w i t h  a u thor) ( li n cl i n g  a nega t i ve corre l a tion between board size and profi t a b i l i t y  in s m a l l  
ami m ed i u m  size Fin n i s h  firms);  D a vid Yermack.  Higher J'vfarker Valuation of Co11 1pan ies 
1virlz 11  S111ull Board of Direuors , 40 J. FIN.  EcoN.  1 85 ( 1 996)  ( fi n d i ng an i n ve rse r e l a t i on­
s h i p  bc:tm.:en board s ize and firm value ) .  
' 11 1  See. e. g . H e r m a l i n  & Weisbach,  supra note 8 1 . at 1 1 1  ( s ugges t ing e�s o n e  poss i b l e  
c x p Ll iLl t l ('n  fpr � tudics  t h a t  "board composi t ion s i m p l y  docs n u t  matte r " ) .  
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sufficiently sensitive to  capture the relevant differences m board 
structure .  
Defining independence appropriately for purposes of these 
studies i s  particularly difficult .  Many studies rely on relatively su­
perficial criteria in classifying directors as independent-treating 
employee-directors as insiders, for example ,  and non-employees as 
independent-rather than attempting the massive task of scrutiniz­
ing personal t ies and business relationships . 9 1  G iven the concern 
that employment s tatus alone is an insufficient indication of a di­
rector's capacity for independent action,92 the fai lure of studies to 
s c ru t i n i ze  i ndepende nce  m or e  c a refu l l y  m a y  exp l a in  t h e i r  
findings. 93 
Class ifying directors appropriately in terms of independence is  
also complicated by the issue of whether the relevant criterion i s  
independence from the company or independence from the  CEO.  
I f  the board i s  viewed a s  a check on the  power of the  CEO in par­
ticular, instead of as a general management decis ionmaker,  then 
seemingly m inor personal ties between otherwise independent 
business people and the CEO may hamper the board's effective­
ness .'-'4 The board at Disney, for example ,  drew cri ticism recently 
because i t  i ncluded a number of directors who, although they 
lacked business relat ionships with  the company, had financial or 
personal ties to Disney's CEO, Michael E isner.95 Director inde­
pendence from the CEO, as opposed to independence from the 
company, is  considerably more difficult to  analyze because most 
existing reporting requirements do not provide meaningful data on 
IJ I For example.  t h e  H e r m a l i n  a n d  We isbach study classified a l l  n o n - e mployee directors 
as · ·outside d i rectors . . .  See H e r m a l i n  & We is  bach. supra note 8 1 ,  a t  105 . More rece n t  
studies a t t e m p t  to address t h i s  shortco m ing.  See, e.g . .  Cotter e t  a ! . .  supra n o t e  7 8 .  a t  1 2  
(class i fying as independent  only d i rectors wi th  n o  professional  t ics t o  t h e  company and 
assessi n g  t h e  e ffect of mod i fying t h i s  c lassifica t ion) .  
n See, e.g . .  O rwall & Lubli n .  supra note 9 ( descr ib ing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i nvestor c la ims t h a t  
outside d irectors o n  D i sney's  board a r e  n o t  t r u ly ind epen d e n t ) .  See also Jeffrey J .  Clark,  
Kahn v.  Lynch Com m u nicat ion Systems.  I nc . :  A /v!ajor S1ep To ward Clarifying 1he Role of 
!ndependenl Conuniuees, 20 D E L. J .  CO RP.  L. 564, 581 ( 1 995) ( e x p l a i n i n g  t h a t  even in­
depen d e n t  d i rectors may not  be com p l e t e l y  obj ect ive decis ion m a k e rs ) .  
'!3 See D a llas .  supra note 7 3 .  at l 8- l 9  ( describ ing t h e  fail ure o f  s tudies  to d ist inguish 
between independent  outs ide d i rectors a n d  those who m a i n t a i n  p rofessi o n a l  relat ions h i ps 
with the corporat ion and concluding t h a t  i t  is u n l i k ely t h a t  e mpir ica l  s tud ies  can re l iably  
te�t  the age ncy cost  e ffec t  of outs ide d i rect ors on the board ) .  
IJ -l  See John E .  Core e t  al.. Corporate Governance.  C E O  Compensation & Firm Per­
for m a nce 2-3 ( M �tr .  1 7 . 1 99 7 )  ( un p ub l ished m a n uscr ipt .  on fi le  w i t h  author ) ( tl n ding t h a t  
C E Os :It f irms wi th  weuk monitoring h u m d s  arc able to extr�tct grea ter  compe n s a t i o n ) .  
'1:'- Sec Orwall  & L u b l i n .  supm n o t e  l) (describing pe rsona l t i e s  between Disnev board 
m e m b e rs a n d  Eisner ) .  
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re lationships with the CE0.'-)6 Persona l  t ies ,  in particulRr ,  are virtu­
al ly impossible to uncover with any assurance of accur acy. 
An alternative possibi l i ty ,  consistent with the find ings of stud­
ies l inking board composi t ion to board function ,  is  that board 
structure affects board effectiveness ,  but the relat ionship be tween 
director independence and firm performance i s  more complex than 
a l i near corr e spondence . As th e prece d i n g  analys is  suggested ,  
board function includes aspects of man aging a s  wel l  as moni toring. 
Although greater independence may enhance the board ' s  abi l i ty to 
monitor ,  independence may a lso red uce the board ' s  manager i al ef­
fective ness .  Accordingly, the modern move to i ncreased board and 
director independence analyzed in these studies may result in a 
cost/benefi t  trade-off that cannot be fu i ly cap tured i n  a study that 
measures overa l l  performance . 'n If both mon i toring and managing 
are important components of board funct i o n .  a s t udy m ay fai l  to 
identify systematic gains from greater board i nde p e nd e nce because 
of the corresponding costs a t tributabie t o  t h a t  indepe n d e n c e .  
IV.  TH E CosTs oF  TH E MoN ITC R I NC B oJ\ R D  
This Articl e  suggests tha t  the  com p l e x i t y  of  the  relat ionship 
between board independence and firm perform a n ce m ay be  ex­
p lained by costs associated with the m o n i t oring board , costs for 
which reform e fforts fai l  adequately to account .  \"!hen a l l  o t h e r  
factors are  equaL greater board i n d e pe n d e n ce enhances  the 
board ' s  ability to monitor ;  therefore incre a s i n g i n d e p e nd e n ce adds 
va lue .  The prob lem,  however ,  is that  if  corporate gov e rn ance re­
form increases the relat ive importance of boc:rd m o n i to r i n g .  a l l 
other factors are not held equal .  
As  Professor Brudney warne d  more than ten  years ago,  the re 
is a natura l  inconsistency betwe e n  the board ' s  rn o n i tor i ng and 
managing funct ionsYs As a board part i c i p a t e s  act i v e l y  i n  corporate 
decisionmaki ng, it sacrifices the c a p aci ty  to monitor those decisions 
i nd e p e n d e n tly .  A board that has negot i a ted  the struct ure o f  a 
m erger is unab le  to  evaluate the transact ion n e utra l ly .  Th e board 
that works c losely to advise the C F O  <m el o t h e r  top  execut i ves sac-
Yh Co n sc q u e n t l v .  b e t te r  d i sclosure o n  d i rector  : n ci c r'•: n Lk n c c .  : · ;H h e r  th ;m m a n d a t ed 
s w ndards ol i n ck p e n d c n cc .  wou l d  fac i l i t a t e  e m p i r i c ; : !  ; � sscss m e n h  ( l l  t h e i m porLwcc u f  
board st ruct u re .  
9 7  5)ec. e . g  . .  H cr rn a l i n  & \\\: i s h a c h .  supru n n t c  �; i .  ; 1 t  I I  l ( ; L: ,_: � -· �; t i n ;: t h ct l  t h e i r  h n d i n gs 
can be reconc i l e d  w i t h  c \ i de n cc t h a t  o u t s i d e  d i rcdm:, :l i e  d k c t i , ,_. i 1W n i t t > r�; rc cu!!n i z i n g.  
t h cl t  i ns i d e  d i rcct ur�. abo a d d  v a l u e  < m d  L h ;l l ; :n  u p l i m;l l  hu;ird ill < � '- req u i re ; �  m i :-;t u rc o r  
bot h ) .  
9 "  See B r u t..l n c v .  \ilfi l"£1 n o t e  3S_ a t  632 -3S .  
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rifices the distance necessary to assess executive performance criti­
cal ly .  Moreover, to the extent that the board undertakes an 
affirmative role in  strategic p lanning, the performance that the 
board evaluates i s  part ial ly its own . Should a board j udge a CEO 
deficient who adheres to  the board's s trategic p lan for the corpora­
t ion when that p lan produces poor results? 
Alternatively, a board that maintains a greater distance may 
risk inadequately understanding the company i t  i s  attempt ing to 
monitor.9l) Although reform proposals stress the problem of board 
passivity and the fai lure to take effective corrective action, i t  is also 
dangerous for a board to engage in excessive or inappropriate ef­
forts to override management .  1 00 The po licy reasons behind j udi­
ci a l  adoption of the business j udgment rule-including deference 
to the expertise of specialized manage ment and providing manage­
ment with the freedom to take risks-counse l  against a l lowing the 
board to second guess management as wel l .  Too much involve­
ment by a monitoring board can squelch management in i t iative . 1 0 1 
This problem is exacerbated by ins t itutional investor pressure 
for less board passivity and greater accountabi l i ty .  An independ­
ent board may well be responsive to cal ls for change by the press or 
dissatisfied inst itutional investors .  Investors' dissatisfaction with 
corporate performance is not necessari ly an indication that  board 
action is warran ted, however, and investor pressure may cause a 
board inappropriate ly to repl ace a CEO or change corporate 
strategy. 1 02 
Another cost associated with the monitoring board is the sacri­
tl.ce of substantial value offered bv the avai lab ii i tv of the board of 
0 -
directors as a management resource . 111rough the mechanism o f  
t h e  board o f  directors, corporations are able t o  obtain the services 
of talented executives at an amazingly low price. 1 03 It is difficult to 
<J'J See B a iley I n terview. supra no te 63 (expl a i n i n g  t h a t  part ic ipation on bo;mi by bank­
as. customers.  and supp l i ers c a n  prevent  a companv from m ak i ng " 'cos t l y  e rrors · · ) .  
I < lo Excessive m on it ori n g  can a lso  red uce the e fhcien cy of corporate decis ion m a k i ng .  
See, e.g . K armcl .  supra note  1 0. a t  5 5 2  ( q u e s t i o n i n g  w h e t h e r  t h e  acco u n t <l b i l i ty ellect  or 
i ndepemk n t  board i s  wort h  t h e  cost  o r  t h e  reduct ion i n  decis ion m ak i n g  e ftl c i e n c y ) .  
J i l l See. e . g  . . M il l s t e i n ,  sup ra note I .  a t  1 43 3  ( " 'Too deep a n d  freq u e n t  i n te rve n t i on by the  
boa rd m a v  m a k e  m a n agers r isk ave rse . con d i t ioned to aw�1 i t  b o a r d  gu i d a nce.  A n d  i f  a plan  
i s  p roposed by t h e  board , rather  t h a n  m a nage m e n t .  m a n a ge m e n t n ; a y  n o t  h ave the  same 
ve�tcd J nterest  in c a rr y i n g  i t  th roug h as i t  would ha\ 'c i f  i t  h a d  c!cve iupcd t h e  p i < m .  · · ) .  
J ( )2 See. e.g. . S m i t h .  supra note 6 3 .  a t  1040-4 1 ( q uest ion ing whether t h e  K !l l a rt honrd 
correct ! \' res�xmded to i ns t i t u t ion al  pressure by forc i n g  t h e  dcpanure of CEO Joe 
1\ n ton i n i ) .  
1 0-' Sec S t e r iwn N .  K a p l a n  & D a v i d  Rc i sh us . Ou rsi(/t' O irecronl1ips u n d  C<Hfiomre Per­
.f(, n n unu· .  27 .l . f- 1.'! .  E c n 01 .  3S9.  3SlJ-9 1 ( I  L)l)U ) ( find ing t h a t c l'k ct i v c  e x c c u t i v·�s e� r•.: mor,' 
l i k c ! v  tu he s c: l c c r c d  � 1s C J u ts idc cl i rcctms u! u t h c r  c u m p � 1 n i c: s ) .  
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overstate the value of formulating long-term corporate s t ra tegy 
with the assis tance of Warren B uffett ,  Henry Kravis, or Wal ter 
Scott .  To the extent that board function is  restricted to  m oni toring, 
a corporation makes limited use of this m anagement resource . 1 04 
Even defenders of the monitoring board acknowledge that 
monitoring is properly characterized as a safety valve for crisis situ­
ations .  A monitoring board facil i tates dealing with problems;  i t  
does not solve ineffective operating strategies or assure good per­
formance . 1 05 The need to  employ this safety valve is rare , however. 
Any particular company confronts crisis with l imited frequency. A 
board that holds itself apart from corporate decisionmaking to  re­
tain neutrality in a time of crisis is a costly mechanism to m aintain 
for crisis management .  
V .  REDISCOVERING B OARD FUNCTION 
The costs associated with strengthening the monitoring func­
tion of the board suggest that reformers and commentators need to 
take board function more seriously. Tnis does not require rej ection 
of the monitoring board. Many companies can benefit from in­
creased monitoring. 1 06 Corporations such as W.R .  Grace, 1 07 Morri­
son Knudsen, 1 08 and Archer D aniels Midland109 revea l  a frequent 
corre lation between consistently under-performing companies and 
boards that lack sufficient independence to exercise meaningful 
J I J-1 See. e .g. ,  B rudney. supra note 38. a t  6 1 1  (observing that ,  to the exten t  d i rectors are 
chose n to pol ice the  in tegrity of man age m e n t, their  e ffective ness is l i m i t e d  to  t h a t  role ,  
depr i v i ng t h e  corpora tion of  t h e i r  o t h e r  talents) .  
I US See, e.g. , Hermal i n  & Weisbach, supra note 81 ,  a t  1 1 1  (observing that  "the o utside­
d irector-as-monitor l i terature has  focused on extraord i na ry events . . .  from w h i ch i t  is  
d i fficu l t  to ascertain the  value of day-to-day monitoring by outside d i rectors " ) .  
J oG Bur see FischeL supra n o t e  19 ,  a t  1291 -92 ( arguing t h a t  no empir ical  e v i d ence s u p ­
ports the conclusion t h a t  greater mon i toring by boards i s  necessary) . 
L u7 See Robert W. Lear & Boris  Ya vi tz.  The B est and Worst Boards of 1 995: Evaluming 
rhe Boardroom . CHIEF ExECUTIVE ( U . S . ) ,  Nov. 1 995, at 24 (describ ing p r i or selection of 
W . R .  G race board as one of  America 's  worst, based on board compos i t i o n .  a n d  finding 
choice "borne out  by subseq uen t  events " ) . 
J o:-: See id. ( describ i ng Morrison K n u ds e n ' s  board as one of the five worst for reasons 
inc lud ing absence of any outside d irectors who had ever run or managed an industrial  
busi ness. predominance of d irectors who were b usiness affi l ia tes or person a l fri e n ds of the 
C E O  o r  h is  wife .  and a t tr ibut ing company's poor perform ance , in  part ,  to  th e board 's 
i n a t ten t ion ) . 
1 1 J'J See id. ( iden t i fying A O �,;l ' s  board as one of the five worst for 1 995:  not ing  t h a t  only 
une d i rector on l 7-mcmber board a ppears free of personal  or profession al connections to 
the  CEO. and i n ferr ing  re la t ionsh ip between board structure and A D M ' s  involvemen t i n  
p r ice- f i x i n g  scheme) .  
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oversight . I l l )  These examples also demonstrate that increased 
board independence can have a meaningful impact in reducing ex­
ecutive excesses or improving profitability. Fol lowing the success­
ful modern ization of governance standards a t  W. R .  Grace ,  
including the instal lat ion of an activist independent board and a 
CEO unre l ated to the Grace family, earnings and stock price at the 
company skyrocketed .  1 1 1  
Curre nt  reform efforts frequently focus on cosmetic improve­
ments to board structure rather than the re lationship of that struc­
ture to firm performance. Reformers fai l  to  recognize that 
managing and monitoring are dist in c t  components of board func­
t ion, t hus ignoring the trade-off between monitoring and managing 
e ffectiveness .  Consequently ,  reformers. particularly inst i tutional 
investors. seek to require greater director independence and in­
creased board monitoring in a l l  corporations, regardless of the an­
ticipated benefits of  that monitor ing or the cost imposed by 
sacri ficing board management services . 1 1 2  
Recent protests by inst i tutional investors about the lack o f  in­
dependence of the Disney board of directors, despite D isney's phe­
nomenal performance. 1 13 i l lustrate this concern . 1 1 .., Investors have 
c la imed that ten members of the sixteen member board have finan­
cial t ies to the com pany or the CEO that compromise their inde­
pendence . Investors also crit icize the board 's  approval of CEO 
i ! l l  See B y rn e  & :vl clc h ..: r.  supm n o t e  � ( d e scri b i n g  W. R .  G race.  A D IVL a n d  'Vforr i son 
K n udsen < :s  �: m u ng s t rung p e r for m i n g  com p a n i e s  tha t  s t u m b l e d  beGl l l se t h ey l a c k e d  s trong 
,md i n d e p e n d e n t  boards  ut"  d i rccturs ) :  E l son . sup ru n o t e  l S . a t  l 2S ( desc r i b i ng p e r form a nce 
la i i u r..:s <ll  t hese and other compan ies and a t t r i but ing t h e  fai l ur e s  to passive boards t h a t  
: n s u l! i c i c n t l y  h e l d  m an age m e n t  acco u n t a b l e ) :  B ar b a n1 E i t o rr e .  Changing 1/ze Rules of 1ize 
Hounl Gunzcs: !Jourds of' D irccron . lv! c c.tT. R r. v  . . Apr .  1 996. at 1 3  (describ i n g  l <tck of i mk ­
p c nclc: ncc a t  A D i'vl a nd i\;[o rrison K n u d s e n  b o a rds ) .  
; t l See E l i z a b e t h  Lesiy.  fir!! fi·ull z Grace . Bus .  W K  . .  M a y  29.  1 995.  at  60 ( descr i b i n g  
i n nca:;es i n  corpor a t e  e a r n i n g s  a n d  s t oc k  price s i n e..: G race o b t a i n e d  a t r i m m e d .  i ndepe n d ­
e n t  h o a rd ) .  
1 1 :? Sec. e.g. . Larry E .  Rib:;i<.' i n .  Tlze Mundu!uJT 1Vur11 1 e uf rhc A L l Code. 6 1  G Eo .  W.-\Sl l .  
L R : :. ' . lJ� "i .  ')l)_-, ( 1 993 ) ( · · \ T J hough o u ts i ck d i rectors  m a y  benef i t  m a n y  li rms .  t h e y  a l s o  
m <:y i m pose c n s t s .  s t : c h  a .'; i n te r fe r e n ce wi t h  b o � t r d  f u n c t i o n s .  t h a t  o u t we i g h  m o n i t o r i n g  
h..: n c i i t s  . . .  ) . 
I I .' l n s l i l u t i u n � : l  <lC t i v i s t  T I Ai-\-C R E F. ro r <.' X <! l1l p k .  � t a tcs t h <l t  i t  t a rgeh comp<l ll i es for 
gm c rn : t n ce reform ..: !funs w i t h o u t  reg<� r c! t u  t h e i r  t i n <t l l c i a l  p..: r fur m a n c..: . E m p i r i c a l  a n a l Y ­
s i s  s u p p u r h  t h i s  :-;t ; : tcmen t .  See \Vi i l <t r d  T. Ct r l e t <.'il <: l ;d  . .  The i n f1 u e n c..: o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  u n  
Ct : rpor<l lc ()o,  e r n a nce Th rough Pr i\ a tc i\' ego t i < t l i t > lh b·i ckncc frum ·r i A A-C R E F  2 3  
( 'VL:,· _-,U .  l 1)'J7 ) ( u n p u b l i s h e d  m ': n uscr i p t .  un ! i l c  w i t h  � tu t h o r ) .  
l l -t Sec. e . .  t: . . O r wa l l  -\: L u b l i n .  ' upm n u t ..: lJ ( d cscr i h i n g  cr i t i L· i s m s  lw i n st i t u t i om: l i l l \ cs­
tuP.; t h �1 t .  d;.:-spi h.: [) isncv·s  � ucc�ss. i t  dnt.-:: s  nut  nh_' L' t 1 b c  cor pnr� : lL  govt: n 1 t1 n c._� s t �u ld�l rLb 
i ih: y �._k· nt : i !HI ) .  
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Michael E isner 's compensation package 1 1 5 even though experts  ac­
knowledge that Eisner can j ustifiably command the high pay based 
on his  success i n  taking D isney's earnings and stock price t o  record 
highs . 1 1 6  
The preceding analysis o f  the m anaging and moni toring as­
pects of  board function does not purport to provide a complete 
normative vision of the role of the board of directors. This Article 
does ,  however, take the posit ion that efforts to construct an ideal 
board are unwarranted .  Ideal board structure , as explained above , 
depends on board function.  1 1 7 Contrast ing examples such as W.  R. 
Grace with B erkshire Hathaway, suggests that companies can h ave 
very different needs from their boards of directors, and that  a uni ­
versal model  board may be  incapable o f  meet ing those n eeds .  
Firm-specific characteristics may cause some corporat ions to  
require more extensive monitoring from the i r  boards of directors. 
In other firms, alternative monitoring mechanisms operate as sub­
st i t utes for board monitoring. 1 1 8 Ownership structure , for example ,  
can provide an alternative monitorin g  device . Firms with a control­
l ing stockholder appear to require less monitoring by directors ,  1 1 9 
and creditors may substitute for monitoring by equity-holders . 1 20 
Institutional i nvestors or banks may monitor management behav­
ior d i rectlyY ' Simi larly, the influence exerted by the m arkets in 
1 1 5 See Paul Fa r h i .  Disnev Chief tv!av Reap $771 Million jimu Stock Ofilions .  W.-\SH.  
PosT. Feb .  22. 1 997. a t  D l . 
l l (i For example .  Graef Crysta l .  an expert  on execut ive compen s a t i o n .  d e fe n ds t h e  
bo:.1 rc! "s  appn)\'a l of E isner 's  pay package as necessary to preven1  compe t i tors from h ir i ng 
E isner  away from Disney .  " [T] here a r c  people o u t  t h e re c i rcl i ng t h e  biock r e a d y  to m a k e  
h i m  a n  offer t h a t  beats y o u r  offer. . . Christ ine Shenot . 'vVill Conrrm·ersy Steal Disne_v ·s 
5/tOI \' ? ,  0R t.ANDO S ENTI N E L ,  Feb .  23. 1 99 7 ,  a t  H l .  Cryst a l  further e x p l a i n s  t h a t  " i f  Sony 
had tr ied to l ur e  h i m  away. they would h ave o ffered him Tokyo and thrown in Kyo to as a 
bonus. · '  Fa rh i .  supra n o te 11 5 .  
1 1 7 See B a rry D .  B aysinger & H e n ry N .  B u t l e r , Revolurion Versus Evolu rion i n  Curpom­
tir)//  L{llv: The A L l 's Projecr and the Independent Director, 52 GEo.  WASH. L Rr:.v. 5 5 7 .  
578 ( 1 984) ( lind ing t h a t  successful corporat ions  e mploy varying proport ions o t'  i ns iders a n d  
i ndepe n d e n t d i rectors) .  
I I " See. e. g . .  Agra wal & Knoebcr.  supra no t e 83 (fi n d i ng i n terdepe n d e n ce bet ween mon­
i toring mec h a n i s m s ) :  C:henc h u r a m a i a h  T.  B a t h a l a  & Ramesh P.  Rao. Tlzc Dcicrminw z rs of 
Board Composition: A n  A gency Theorv Perspeoivc . 1 6  MAN,\CERl,\ L & D EC I S I O N  [coN. 
59 ( 1 995)  ( fi nd ing empirical  evidence sugges t i ng that  other moni tor ing mech a nisms suc h  as  
m <m uger s tock owne rsh i p ,  leverage.  a n d  h igh d i v i de n d  payouts ,  m a y  subst i tute  for ou ts i de 
d i rector moni toring) .  
1 1 9 See B LKk.  supra n o te 65.  :1 t 9 1 7  (s t :H i n g  that  t h e  · ' :w:t i l ab lc  e v i dence s u ggests  a gen­
'� r a l l y  pos i t i v e  l ink  between concen trated owne rsh ip a n cl corpora t e  perforrml!lce . .  ) .  
l ? l l  See generally Tri <m t is & D a n i e l s .  SIIJJr(l n o t e  23 ( descri b ing ro le  o r  credi tors :\:) 
mun itors w i t h i n  :1 n m tcrac t ive  sys t e m  of corporate  govern ance ) .  
1 ::'. 1  5iee. e.g . .  B e rnard S .  BLick .  , \ge/ 1 /s Wutclzing ;\gel z fs: Th e Prum ise of lnslifl l fionul 
!I Z I C.I !or Voice. 39 UCLA L .  R r: v .  i:\ ! ! .  f()lJ-49 ( l Y91 ) ( <:\p l a i n i n !!. how i n ,; t i t u t i o n :t l  i rwcs tors 
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which the firm competes-the product, capi ta l ,  m anagement ,  and 
takeover m arkets-varies  the need for board monitoring. 1 22 
The nature of a corporat ion's  b usiness may also affect its need 
for board monitoring. Some industries present greater opportuni­
t ies for management self-dealing. A firm with large free cash 
reserves, for example ,  or one in  which direct market oversight of 
m anagement decisionmaking i s  difficult ,  needs an enhanced inter­
nal monitoring structure . 1 23 In  contrast ,  firms in  regulated indus­
tries may require less monitoring by virtue of the transactional 
controls mandated by regulat ion . 1 24 
Some firm-specific characteristics call for greater use of the 
managing board. Immature or rapidly growing firms that face ex­
tensive strategic planning decisions waste a valuable resource i f  
they do no t  util ize the  business expertise of  their board members i n  
management decis ions .  1 25 Troubled firms, those in  transit ion, or 
those with an inexperienced CEO may need to rely heavily upon 
the expertise of directors for managerial funct ions such as advising 
management .  Engaging directors in  firm management  is e ffic ient 
for firms that require managerial support ,  particularly in compari­
son to the cost of  obtaining s imi lar services through outside 
consultants .  
Increased business complexity further demands that corpora­
tions involve directors in s trategic planning and other management 
decisions. Boards that include directors with technical  expertise ,  
industry background, or experience in  comparable business issues, 
provide a CEO with a team of experts .  Their input can enhance 
c a n  serve as effective mo n i t o rs ) : L\ STE IU l l<.oo�-: & F I S C H E L .  supra n o te 6 9 .  a t  46 ( descr ib­
ing abi l i ty  of  b a n k s  and other f inancial  i n s t i t u t ions to moni tor corpora t e  clecisionmaking) :  
Saul  Levmore. /Vfon irors and Freaidcrs in Con un erciul and Corporure Scaings . 92 Y,\ L E  
L . J .  49 .  56  ( 1 982 ) (de fen d i ng e ffect iveness o f  b a n ks as mon i to rs ) . 
1 22 See James A. B r ic k le y  & C h r i s topher  1vL James.  The Tokeu1 ·cr lvlarker, Corporare 
Board Conzposirion, and O lt'n ership Srrucrure: Tlze Case uf Banking, 30 J . L. & EcoN. 1 6 1  
( 1 987)  (studyi n g  poss i b l e s ubs t i t u t i on re l a t i on sh i p  between board co m pos i t i on a n d  t a k e ­
o v e r  regu l at i on unde r s t a t e  ba n k i ng l aw ) .  
1 23 See Robe rta Rom ano.  A Guide 1 0  Tak.em·ei"S: T/1eon·. Cridence. and Regularion .  9 
Y ". LE J .  ON R Ei .  1 1 9. 1 3 1 -32 ( l <.)l)2 ) ( np l a i n i n g  t h a t  m a r k e t ' s  C< tpct c i t y  t o  mon i tor m a n age­
men t i s  re duce d  for c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  excess c a s h ) :  Jcn n i f'er Arlen & Debora h M. We iss.  A 
Po lilica/ Tlz cury of Corporale Tuxarion . 1 05 Y .-\ L ic L J .  .125 .  34S-350 ( l lJ LJS ) ( arguing t h a t  
management prefe rs po l icv o f  re t a i n i n g  l a rge amounts  o f  corporate e a rn i n gs t o  a\ 'oid t h e  
gre a te r  moni to r i n g  associ a t e d  \V i t h  o b t a i n i ng c a p i t ct l  t h rough n e w  e q u i ty i ssues  or d e b t  
li n a n c i ng ) .  
1 2-1 See Baiky l n t e n iew.  supra note 6 3  ( no t i ng t h a t  regu l a t ion Ill'!" red uce opport u n i t ies 
for lllcl !lage m e n t  s e l f-cl c a l i n g ) .  Baiky alsu s uggests  ! h el l .  beGt use o f  t h e  l i m i t a t ion s o n  com­
['c l i t lo n  imposed hy regu l a t i o n .  fi r m .� in regu ! , l t ed i ml u s 1 r ies  m " �· h �1ve gre<J t e r  n e e d  for  t h e  
i n for m a t i o n  a n d  expert i se  pru\ i d e d  lw s t ro n g  d i re c to h  i n  o rd e r  t o  c o m p e t e .  
1 2=' Sec id. 
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corporate decisionmaking and prevent  costly mistakes.  Firms seek­
ing to expand their international operat ions ,  for example ,  can ben­
efit from the participation of outside directors with experi ence in 
the idiosyncracies of foreign markets .  1 26 
These factors i l lustrate how the relat ive importance of board 
managing and monitoring can vary from firm to firm. B oard struc­
ture should be ta i lored to the needs of a particular firm. For a 
growth company in  a developing field,  faced with a variety of s tra­
tegic decisions and an inexperienced CEO ,  the board 's  role as 
m an ager may be  an essential component of firm success .  That  role 
may require board members with developed industry experti se ,  
business relationships wi th the firm, or even insiders .  Alterna­
tively, for an established company with large cash reserves and a 
dispersed shareholder body, monitoring m ay be  more important ,  
and  the  board m ay need board members sufficiently independent 
of both personal and professional relationships with m anagement 
to  ask tough quest ions .  Similarly ,  if  inst i tut ions are able to  target 
under-performing companies in  which inside directors have not  
m anaged effectively, replacing these directors wi th outs iders may 
increase monitoring capabil ity at l i t t le  cost .  Furthermore , a finn's  
needs may change , requiring corresponding adj ustments t o  board 
s tructure . 1 27 
The historical evo lution of the  board supports  the conclusion 
that managing is an important component of board function and 
that absent regulatory pressure , firms wil l  use a governance struc­
ture compatible with this function .  This intuit ion is supported by 
· ' race to the top" arguments about state corporation statutes . 1 2:-; If 
managing functions were an insignificant aspect of m odern board 
function, state statutes would presumably evolve away from requir­
i ng boards to manage and toward a greater emphasis on directors '  
moni toring obligations .  Thi s  evolution has not occurred . 1 2 'J The 
I 2h Sci.'. e. g . . Et torre.  supra n o t e  l l O ( d escri b i n g  r a t i o n a l e  beh i n d  C a m p b e l l  S o u p .  I n c . 's 
addit ion of David K. P. Li.  a Hong Kong banking C E O .  to i ts board to assist  Campbelrs i n  
t a k i n g  adva n t age o f  t h e  po te n t i a l ly h uge C h i n a  m ar k e t  f or  i t s  prod uc ts ) . 
1 27 W i t h  the de part ure of Wa rre n B u ffet t ,  for e xa m p l e . t h e  com pos i ti o n  o f  t h e  B e rk s h i re 
H at haway board may n e e d  to ch ange i n  respo nse . 
1 2 s Sel.'. I.'. g . .  D a n i e l  R Fi sch e l . Tlz e  · · Race ro r/u: Borro11z · ·  R e v isired: Rcfleuions un Recen t 
De velop11 1 cn ts in D elinvure ·s Corporation Lcnv .  76 N w .  U. L R F v .  l) l J  ( l l)82 ) ( c l a im i n g  
th a t  r:'ICe tO t h e  bot tom c h a racter iza t i o n  O f  corporate J a w  requ i re s S h a rc h o J cl e rs t O b e h ave 
i rrat ion;l i l y ) :  Ralph K. 'v\'i n te r.  Swte Lmv. Slzarelzolder Prorection. and the Theory of tl1c 
Corpr m11iun . (i J .  LFC .. \L Stu D .  25 1 ( 1 9 7 7 )  ( a rguing t h a t  compe t i t i on in var ious  m a r k e t s  
causes corpora t i o n s  to com pe te to se l ec t t h e  mos t e ffic i e n t  govcrn<l n ce st ruct ure ) .  
1 2'1  Sec H c rm a l i n  &: Wc i sbach . supra note 7 2 .  a t  2o-27 ( s uggest i ng t h a t  m a rk e t  forcL·s 
J i m i l  t h e  c ffeL·t Uf  gov e r n < l llCC t cfurms Ull buar d i n d e p e nde nce ) .  
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flexibil i ty provided by state corporation law suggests that it may be 
efficient to  allow corporations to  tai lor board s tructure to the func­
t ions most  important to each individual corporation . 1 30 
The experience of Berkshire Hathaway supports this conclu­
sion. B erkshire Hathaway has demonstrated a consistently out­
s tanding performance record without adopting any of the popular 
governance reform proposals .  Judged by modern s tandards , B erk­
shire H athaway's governance s tructure is decidedly antiquated. 
The curren t  six member board is dominated by insiders-Warren 
Buffet t ,  his wife and son ,  and Charles Munger, the Vice Chairman. 
The company only added Walter Scott ,  Jr . ,  the second of the two 
independent directors to i ts board in 1 988 when i t  l is ted i ts  stock 
on the NYS E  and was compelled by NYSE rules to have two in­
dependent directors . 1 3 1 The board contains none of the structural 
mechanisms designed to enhance independent board action. The 
audit committee ,  which is required by NYSE rules ,  is the only 
board committee . 1 32 There is no lead outside director; Warren Buf­
fet t  holds both the posit ions of chairman of the board and CEO 
and clearly dominates corporate decisionmaking. 
The monitoring functions provided by an independent board 
appear unlikely to provide substantial value to Berkshire 
Hathaway, however. In  part , this i s  because , i n  addit ion to his 
other roles, Warren B uffet t  i s  also the control l ing shareholder of 
the company. Studies show that controll ing stockholders are able 
to provide effective monitoring and, accordingly, corporations with 
a control ling stockholder suffer few of the agency costs tradition­
ally associated with the separation of ownership and control .  
Although a monitoring board is a mechanism for addressing the 
problems associated with the separation of ownership and control , 
i ts importance is questionable for a corporation in  which that sepa­
ration does not exist .  
Buffet t ' s  decisionmaking at Berkshire Hathaway also appears 
to embody the principles of good corporate governance despite the 
absence of board monitoring. Hathaway's executive compensation 
system, for example ,  is both incentive-based and designed to re­
ward managers based on productivity in the areas for which they 
have responsibil i ty. rather than on overall corporate perform-
l 3I J  See K a n11eL supra note  1 0 . a t  5 4 4  ( . .  Ne i ther  fed e r a l  n o r  s t a te Lt w i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  has  ever d i c t a t e d  t h e  compos i t i o n  of  boards o f  d i rectors. n o r  h as t h e  l ct w  a t t e mpted  
to dd!nc necessary q u a l i fi c a t ions  for  d i rectors o f  publ ic ly  h e l d  corpor a t i on s . · · ) .  
1 3 l  See Butfi:rr Es.\ U \'S . supra n o t e  2 1 .  a t  1 2 1 .  
�� = See PROXY ST.\TL \ i E l'T.  supra n u t c 66 ( descri b i n g  t h e  aud i t  co m m i t t e e � 1 n d  c :; p l < t i n ­
i n g  t h a t  t h e  comp�t n v  does rw t have SUt ml i ng cornpens�t t i u n  or n um i n �t t i n g  com m i t t ees ) .  
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ance . 1 33 Studies have l inked incentive-based management compen­
sat ion to firm performance, indicating that this compensat ion 
s tructure is appropriate . 1 34 Simi larly,  the B erkshire Chari table 
Giving Program provides shareholders rather than managers wit h  
responsibi l i ty for designating the beneficiaries of H athaway's  chari­
table donations. 1 35 This structure, in contrast to ordinary corporate 
practice,  minimizes management ' s  abil i ty to  use charitable dona­
t ions for self-dealing. 1 36 
Rather than the corporate board serving as an unnecessary 
m onitor, the Berkshire Hathaway board is constructed to  provide 
value to  the corporation through i ts  managerial role .  TI1e two indi­
viduals responsible for managing the ent ire Berkshire Hathaway 
operation, Warren B u ffet t  and Charles Munger, 137 serve on the 
board, providing both efficiency in  board information-gathering 
and decisionmaking and al igning the management of the company 
with the formal board procedures .  By involving Munger and B uf­
fet t ' s  he irs, Howard and Susan B uffet t ,  in board decisionm ak ing 
and strategic planning, the board s tructure provides those persons 
most l ikely to succeed B uffet t  i n  determining the future of the com­
pany 1 3s with the in formation and experience to faci l i tate the even­
t u a l  m a n a ge m e n t  t r a n s i t i o n .  Th i s  s t r u c t ur e  o ff e r s  s o m e  
reassurance t o  Hathaway stockholders concerned about the long 
term outlook for the company. 1 3l) 
Whether Berkshire Hathaway 's  governance s t ructure wil l  con­
t inue to be effective in  the fut ure if the firm's  management or own­
ership structure change is unclear. 140 Substantial changes in e i ther 
are l ikely to require modificat ions in the structure and funct ion o f  
the Hathaway board .  A t  the moment,  however, the adopt i on  o f  
popular governance reform proposals i s  unl ikely t o  improve B erk­
shire Hathaway's performance.  Even the standardized governance 
provisions mandated by the NYSE-the requirement of two in-
1 33 Sec id. a t  28-29 ( d escr ib i ng execut ive compensat ion p o l i cy ) .  
1 3-� See. e.g . . lvl c h ra n .  supra n ote 75.  a t  165-66. 
135 Sec Buffeu Lssnys. supra note 2 1 .  at 48-50 ( d iscussing The B erksh i rc Progra m ) . 
1 3 (, Set'. e.g . . L!ync W. B arnard.  Corporme PIIi!anriiropr, Execu rivcs · Per Cf/ (/riries u n d  rl1c 
A gency Pru!J!e111 .  41 N . Y. L. ScH. L. R r: v .  ( fort hcom ing 1997 ) ( descr i b i ng t he po t e n t ia l tor 
m an ag e m e n t  se l f-d e a l i n g  in c o n n e c t i o n  w i th corpmate c h <l r i t a b l e  g iv ing) .  
1 37 Sec H u_tf(·u !:. 1 \(l \ S .  supm n o t e  2 1 . at 60 ( describ i n g  13 u ft'e t l  and Munger  as the  o n l y  
o n e s  h av ing  " the  m a nage r i a l  respon s i b i l i t y  for t h e  e n t i re business ' · ) .  
1 3:--: S e c  id. a t  _)lJ--\2 ( descri b i ng p l an s for t h e  com p a n v  <l f ter  B u fie t t ' s  d e a t h ) .  
i3'J See o [su R t et  1 .-\ r:: D  Y .-\ 'i C I L .  PASS I N G  T H E  8 .-\ T O C.: :  !Vl .c\ '-i.-\ C I N C; H I E  PRUCFSS C> F  CEO 
Sl ;cctcss to:--c ( l lJ� 7 )  ( d esc r i b i n g  t he \'<l i u e  o l  i ns i d e  d i re ct ors i n  fac i l i ta t i ng t h e  CEO s u cc e s ­
sion prucc ss ) .  
t -1<1  Sel' !Ju fierr bsu n .  supra note 2 1 .  a t  3lJ--l 1 ( descr ib ing  t h ree d i ffe re n t  own e r/m a n age r  
govcrmmcc nwcl t:. ' l s  a n d  s ugge <; t i n g  d i fk rc nccs  i n  t h e  hnard · s  ro le  a mong t h ese m nclc b ) . 
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dependent directors and an audit commit tee-are of questionable 
value for Berkshire Hathaway. In the absence o f  pressure to con­
form to universal norms, it i s  unl ikely that Berkshire Hathaway 
shareholders would find these requirements-and the enhanced 
CEO monitoring they provide-efficient or desirable .  Indeed, the 
real chal lenge to Berkshire Hathaway is whether i ts  board s truc­
ture is appropriate to deal with the issue of succession upon Bu f­
fet t ' s  eventual departure. 
CONCLU SION 
The difficulty associated with measuring and evaluating direc­
tor qualifications o ffers an explanation for the e ffort to impose a 
uniform board s tructure . I t  is far easier to measure t he number of 
non-employee directors, the number o f  boards upon which a direc­
tor sits, and the business relat ionships between non-employee di­
rectors and the corporat ion,  than to predict a director 's  capacity for 
i ndependent action on an individualized basis .  The risk o f  eval uat­
ing corporations through good governance scorecards, however. is 
that i nvestors wil l  lose sigh t o f  firm performance and focus o n  cri­
teria t hat appear more obj ective and easi ly measured, but ulti­
mately prove o f  l imited value. 1 4 1  A system that rewards a 
corporation for cosmetic changes in i ts  governance structure or 
that finds fault with good performers that do not conform t o  stan­
d a rd i zed  n o r m s  r i s k s  i m p o s i n g  r e a l  c o s t s  u p o n  co rpo ra t e  
productivity . 1 42 
This is not  to dismiss e fforts to facilitate more e ffective moni ­
toring th rough greater board independence. There are cons t a n t  
examples of  corporations l ike W.R.  Grace ,  in  which greater moni­
tor ing can increase firm value .  I t  is the attempt to general ize from 
these examples and to assume that similar changes will increase 
profitability in al l  corporations that has led to current  efforts to 
i mpose a uni form governance model on corporate America. E x ­
amples o f  successful corporations ,  such as Berkshire H athaway , 
that have resisted the pressure to conform , serve as a reminder tha t 
a firm 's  governance structure is not an end in  itself ,  but a means to 
an end.  The i deal model of corporate governance is o n e  that e n -
1 -! 1 See C a t h e r i n e  \'1 .  D a i l y  c t  a l . .  I ns t i t u t i o n a l  I n ve s t or A c t i v i s m :  Fol l ow t h e  Le; I Lkrs · >  
34-35 ( l 9%) ( u n p u b l i s h e J  m a n uscri p t .  o n  f1 l c  with the B u s i n ess Pol i cy and S t rcn cg1· d i l i ­
s i o n  u f  t h <::: A c �t ck m y  o f  M a n age m e n t )  ( fi n d in g  n o  e v i d e nce t h a t  i n st i t u t i o n a l  i m e s t c r  <tc l t \ . 
i s m  on curpor; � t e  gove r n a nce r e forms has i m proved corpor;1 t c  p e r fo r m a n ce ) .  
1 ->2 See. C)�- - We m c r· .  Si lf!/"11 n o t e  2 8 .  a t  1 664 ( descri b i n g  risks t o  s tock l w l d e rs o r' cmpora­
t ions t h :t t  fi) ! IOI\ t he l e t t e r  hut  n o t the: s p i ;· i t  o f  p roposed m o n i to r i n g  bo,t rd m o d e l � )  
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hances the ability of each firm to structure corporate clecis ionmak­
ing in accordance with its particular needs ,  to maximize firm 
performance. 
